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Comment:
In Defense
of the Fault Principlet
Several writers have recently advocated abandoning
the "fault" principle of liability in negligence actions;
they propose to substitute for the principle a strict
method of compensation based on the fact of injury
alone. Mr. DeParcq takes issue with this proposed
revisionof the concept of liability in negligence actions,
and concludes that society cannot yet afford such a
system of compensation.

William H. DeParcq*
Twelve men of the average of the community, comprising men of education and men of little education,
men of learning and men whose learning consists only
in what they have themselves seen and heard, the
merchant, the mechanic, the farmer, the laborer; these
sit together, consult, apply their separate experience
of the affairs of life to the facts proven, and draw a
unanimous conclusion. This average judgment thus
given it is the great effort of the law to obtain. It is
assumed that twelve men know more of the common
affairs of life than does one man; that they can draw
wiser and safer conclusions from admitted facts thus
occurring than can a single judge.
Sioux City & Pac. Ry. v. Stout, 17 Wall. (84 U.S.) 657,
664 (1874).
IN recent years there has been a strong movement spurred
by some judges and law professors to abandon the traditional requirement that recovery for personal injuries or death is limited
to cases where defendant was at "fault" and thus was "negligent,"
f This comment is the substance of an address made before the Michigan State Bar
Association, in Detroit, Michigan, May 2, 1958. It followed the principal address
delivered by Professor Fleming James, Jr., Harvard Law School, entitled "Practical
Changes in the Field of Negligence." The remarks here expressed are intended to
reflect the plaintiffs position on the abandonment of the "fault" principle.
* Member of the Minnesota Bar.
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and to substitute instead a system of strict liability by which every
injured person, or beneficiaries of those deceased, would recover
regardless of fault.
These proposals, which made their first appearance innocuously
enough in the law reviews, but which have since spilled over to
such popular journals as Colliers and the Saturday Evening Post,
would mean a revolutionary change in personal injury litigation as
we know it. For that reason they deserve the most careful scrutiny

by the profession.
The would-be reformers would not agree that they are proposing
a drastic change when they urge abandonment of the fault principle. They believe that the fault principle has long since become
meaningless, and claim that they are merely recognizing what is
already an accomplished fact. "Negligence in Name Only" is the
title of one of their articles,' Professor Ehrenzweig's highly-controversial little book has the paradoxical title, Negligence Without
Fault,2 and two other authors entitle their work, "Is the Law of
Negligence Obsolete ?" 3 After reading the title to that article it

came as no surprise to find the authors concluding twenty-one4
pages later, "The law of negligence as it exists today is obsolete."
This claim, that under present law jury verdicts for plaintiffs are
being allowed to stand even though defendant was not at fault, is
made generally by these writers with regard to automobile cases
and other run-of-the-mill negligence cases. It is urged with particular vehemence with regard to Federal Employers' Liabiity Act
cases. Mr. Justice Jackson protested nine years ago that the fault
principle "is without much practical meaning" in view of Supreme
Court decisions in FELA cases.5 Not only the railroad lawyers but
also the law review writers were quick to take up the cry. Last
winter I wrote an article in the Texas Law Review reviewing the
eleven Supreme Court decisions last term involving FELA. An
able Texas lawyer, writing a reply to my article, called my discussion "a gleeful dance on the grave of the negligence concept .. .
Far from doing a gleeful dance on the grave of the negligence
concept, I think that the negligence concept is still very much alive.
In ordinary personal injury litigation various sets of statistics show
1. Leflar, Negligence in Name Only, 27 N.Y.U.L. REv. 564 (1952).
2. EIIHENZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE WrrIouT FAULT (1951).
3. McNiece & Thornton, Is the Law of Negligence Obsolete?, 26 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 255 (1952).
4. Id. at 276.
5. Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 836 U.S. 53, 76 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
6. DeParcq, The Supreme Court and the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 1956--57
Term, 36 TExAs L. REv. 145 (1957).
7. Gee, A Dissenting Postscript or, Notes From Underground, 36 TEXAs L. REv.
157 (1957).
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that plaintiffs have received verdicts in anywhere from seventy to
eighty-five per cent of all cases. Certainly this means that in from
fifteen to thirty per cent of those cases, the jury has found for the
defendant. The injured persons denied recovery in those cases would
hardly agree that the negligence concept is dead. In FELA cases,
a member of the United States Supreme Court has said that the
basis of liability "is and remains negligence."8 That this is not
mere idle talk is shown by the fact that only last term the Court
unanimously affirmed a directed verdict for the railroad in an FELA
caseY Though the figures are admittedly old, a study by the Railroad Retirement Board of 641 fatal injuries to railroad workers in
the years 1988-1940 showed that only 497 of these resulted in any
cash settlement. 0 In other words in almost one case out of four,
the railroad -presumably because it was not at fault-paid nothing for the death of its employee.
It seems to me that these figures conclusively refute the claim
that the fault principle is dead. So long as a substantial proportion
of defendants are escaping liability for injuries to their employees
because it is determined that they were not at fault, negligence
remains very much the basis for recovery.
This seems to me so clear that I feel even the reformers must
recognize it. My guess is, therefore, that when they say the fault
principle is dead, they do not mean that at all, but are merely overstating their view that the requirement of fault has not barred recovery in some cases where they think recovery should not have
been allowed. They point, for example, to the case of Fergusonv.
Moore-McCormack Lines," in which ice cream in a freezer was so
hard that a ship's waiter could not get it out with the scoop, and
lost two fingers when he took a nearby butcher knife to loosen the
ice cream; or to Ringhiser v. Chesapeake & 0. R.R., 2 where routine
switching of a gondola car caused serious injury to an engineer
who had jumped into the car to satisfy an urgent call of nature.
How, they ask, can you say that the employer was at fault in those
cases? The answer, of course, is that it is not for me to say how
the employer was at fault. Nor is this the job of railroad lawyers or
professors, or even appellate judges. Under our system, this is for
the jury. If the jury, properly instructed, determines that the defendant is at fault, as it must and does when it returns a verdict
against him, it is as silly and as futile to say that the fault principle
8. Douglas, J., concurring in Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 836 U.S. 53, 69 (1949).

9. Herdman v. Pennsylvania M.L, 852 U.S. 518 (1957).
10. U.S. RtuaoAD R-rmnmTE

98 (1947).
11. 352 U.S. 521 (1957).
12. 354 U.S. 901 (1957).

Tny

BoARD, NVoaz INjures IN

=

RALEXoAD IND-us-

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:499

is being abandoned as it would be to say that the presumption of
innocence is dead because in some cases juries have convicted
criminal defendants whom other persons may think not guilty of
the crimes of which they are charged.
All the tumult and the shouting about the fault principle being
dead boils down, then, only to this: Some writers believe that there
are some cases in which juries have found for plaintiffs under circumstances which the writers regard as not involving fault. Undoubtedly this is true. Indeed, it is probably true that there have
been cases in which juries have found for the plaintiff though everyone would agree that defendant was not at fault. The jury is a
human institution, and it would be foolish to expect perfection
from it. But these critics of the jury have yet to produce any evidence that the occasional errors of a jury are all in favor of the
plaintiff, or that they are the result of deliberate disregard of the
fault principle, or that any other system can be devised which would
not err even more frequently. Indeed, such scanty evidence as we
have points in the other direction.
Richard Hartshorne, distinguished federal district judge, and
former Chairman of the Section on Judicial Administration of the
American Bar Association, before his appointment to the federal
bench, was for twelve years a trial judge in Essex County, New
Jersey. During that period, in every case which he tried he wrote
down privately, while the jury was out, his own opinion as to what
the verdict ought to be. After the jury returned he compared its
verdict with his own, and kept statistics as to how they matched.
He regarded the jury's verdict as "wrong," not only if it was against
the party for whom the judge would have decided, but also if the
amount of damages was substantially different from what the judge
would have awarded. The result over the twelve year period was
that "out of the 253 verdicts received, the court had serious question with but thirty-eight, in seventeen of which it was felt that the
verdict for the defendant should probably have been for the plaintiff,
whereas in twenty-one others the verdict for plaintiff should probably have been otherwise." '3 In terms of percentages, in eighty-five
per cent of the cases the jury reached the same result as this able
judge, in seven per cent of the cases the jury found for the defendant
though the judge would have found for plaintiff, and in only eight
per cent of all cases was the jury's verdict more favorable to the
plaintiff than the judge would have given.
Of course these figures are not conclusive. It will be interesting
to see the results of the intensive study which the University of
13. Hartshorne, Jury Verdicts: A Study of Their Characteristics and Trends, 35
A.B.A.J. 113-14 (1949).
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Chicago Law School has been making of juries. But I think we can
fairly say that there is no evidence to date that juries do not make
a conscientious and usually successful attempt to apply the fault
principle discerningly. And it is beyond cavil that the requirement
of fault does continue to bar recovery in a substantial number of
cases. Adoption of a system of liability without fault would then be,
as I asserted at the outset, a revolutionary change in our legal
system.
The mere fact that this proposal represents a change does not,
of course, make it bad. There is much that is attractive in the idea
of providing compensation for all injured persons, rather than confining it to those seventy to eighty-five per cent who are injured
through the fault of another. Liability without fault has very respectable historical roots in the early common-law cases which allowed
recovery in the action of trespass without any showing of negligence.
And I fully believe that the present standard of liability based on
fault has very little effect as a deterrent of carelessness, and thus
that there is no reason to believe we would have more accidents if
the fault principle were abandoned. But before we agree that this
attractive proposal should be adopted, it is necessary to take a very
close look at the consequences it would have for those persons who
have been injured. I propose that we consider first that substantial
group of persons who are harmed by the fault of another, and who
therefore are entitled to recovery at the present time.
Adoption of a system of absolute liability would undoubtedly
mean that those persons would receive a much smaller amount than
they receive at the present time. Many of our present rules of damages make sense only in terms of the fault principle. Take, for
example, recovery for future pain and suffering by a person who has
been injured. Already this item of damages has been severely attacked by Professor Jaffe of the Harvard Law School. 4 And in a
recent issue of the Ohio State Law Journal Professor Plant, of the
University of Michigan Law School, has proposed that in all cases
payment for pain and suffering be limited to fifty per cent of the
actual medical expenses incurred by plaintiff.' 5 Think what this
would mean to the person, for instance, who has lost an arm and
who suffers from a "phantom limb." The marvels of modem medicine are such that an amputated arm is quickly and efficiently dealt
with. A week or two in the hospital, medical expenses of perhaps
$200, and the injured person is sent home. Under Professor Plant's
scheme, the injured person would be awarded only $100 for pain
14. Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 LAw & Con-rrm. PoB. 219, 223-25 (1953).
15. Plant, Damages for Pain and Suffering, 19 Omo ST. L.J. 200, 210-11 (1958).
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and suffering, even though for fifty years he must endure the burning sensation and pain which such an injury causes, as well as the
embarrassment and humiliation which the lost arm will cause.
Professor Plant's proposal strikes me as completely unsound, but
it would be even worse to deny all recovery for this pain and suffering. Yet that is exactly what will happen if liability without fault
becomes the rule. Professor James states it candidly in a recent
article: "Allowance for intangible items like pain and suffering (natural enough where compensation is made by a wrongdoer) may
well be out of place where the bill is being footed by innocent
persons."'(6 The only satisfactory justification for pain and suffering
awards is that pain and suffering does represent a loss to the injured
person, even though a noneconomic loss, and that "as between an
innocent plaintiff and a negligent defendant, it is not difficult to
decide who should bear this loss."

17

Abandon the fault principle and

you will be taking away from injured persons the damages to which
they are now entitled for pain and suffering. By the same token,
damages for "intangible" losses in death cases would presumably
no longer be allowed. At the present time, in FELA cases at least,
the verdict in a death case may include an award for the value of the
care and guidance which deceased provided his children, and for
the services which he performed about the home. 18 This item of
damages will hardly survive abandonment of the fault principle.
Nor is this all. Already there are articles suggesting that there should
be no recovery for loss of consortium in the absence of fault.1" And
the present rule that an injured person can recover for lost earnings,
though his employer has continued to pay him while he was recovering, and that he can recover for medical expenses though some third
party provided them without charge, will certainly be abandoned
if the fault principle is abandoned.20
I think it will be agreed that the person who is injured through
the fault of another will receive a smaller award if liability without
fault should become the rule because of the effect such a change
would have on those rules of damages which are justifiable only in
terms of defendant's fault. But what about his recovery for his actual
out-of-pocket losses, the expenses of his medical care, his lost earnings and the like?
16. James, Some Reflections on the Bases of Strict Liability, 18 LA. L. REv. 293,
297 (1958).
17. DeParcq & Wright, Damages Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act,
17 Omo ST. L.J. 430, 438-40 (1956).
18. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Holbrook, 235 U.S. 625 (1915); Michigan Cent. R.R. v.
Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59 (1913); DeParcq & Wright, supra note 17, at 450-51.
19. E.g., Jaffe, supra note 14, at 228-31.
20. James, Social Insurance and Tort Liability: The Problem of Alternative Romedies, 27 N.Y.U.L. REv. 537 (1952).
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We can start, I think, from the premise that if liability is to be
osed without fault, we will no longer use juries to determine
e damages. As one author says: "If the proposed injured workers'
law is to operate regardless of negligence, it is not likely that its
administration will be left to the already overburdened courts, federal or state." 2' How then will such cases be handled? Justice
Hofstadter, of the New York Supreme Court, gives the obvious
answer. Such cases, he says, should be disposed of "in a sound and
up-to-date manner patterned after the universally accepted system
of workmen's compensation . . . on the basis of established payment schedules adminitered by a state board. . ." 22

As you realize, adoption of the "universally accepted system of
workmen's compensation" for all accident cases will mean a complete
loss of the flexibility which the jury system provides. Damages will
be computed from a statutory schedule, rather than apportioned to
the loss suffered by a particular plaintiff. In an unusually fine article
which appeared this winter in the American Bar Association lournal,
an able Chicago defense lawyer, John C. McKenzie, gave an example of the operation of his state's Workmen's Compensation Act.
"By its provisions," he said, "an Illinois lawyer who lost his index
finger while working would receive $1,480. Contrast that case with
that of a watchmaker, who depends wholly upon the skill of his
hands for his livelihood. He too, for the loss of an index finger, would
receive $1,480. Whatever this is, it is not justice." 2
Not only would awards under an administrative system patterned
after workmens compensation be inflexible, but they also would be
much smaller than verdicts under the usual rules of damages. I am
not going to make the usual shocking comparisons between amounts
which have been recovered in tort cases and the recovery which
would have been had for the same injury under the workmens
compensation law of one state or another. All know what they would
show. Indeed those who want to abandon the fault principle are
generally agreed that the state workmen's compensation acts are
much too stingy, and they would propose more generous recovery
if all accidents were to be brought under a similar scheme. But
recovery can be more generous than under the present statutes and
yet still be far less than full compensation for the harms suffered.
Indeed the reformers admit frankly that they would not attempt to
provide full compensation for the injured person. Professor Jaffe
21. Parker, FELA or Uniform Compensation for AR Workers, 18 LAW & ConTvmc. 1ho. 208, 211 (1953).
22. HoEstader, Lets Put Sense in the Accident Laws, Saturday Evening Post, Oct.
22, 1955, p. 17.
23. McKenzie, What is Truth? A Defense of the Jury System, 44 A.B.A.J. 51,
54 (1958).
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says that "as the goal becomes universal coverage of injury and
disease, protection must tend to shrink toward the minimum level
of economic loss." 24 And Professor James has said: "I regard the
making of some substantial compensation in all accident cases as far
more important than an assurance of the full outer reaches of compensation." 25 In fact when Professor James got around to discussing
this question in the brilliant treatise which he and Professor Harper
recently published on tort law, 0 they make it sound as if the injured
person ought to be ashamed of himself for being so greedy as to
ask for full compensation: "Even when we consider the victim's
pecuniary loss," they say, "we must remember that accidents bring
a net pecuniary loss to society as a whole-the social wealth and
income is thereby diminished-so that if the victim is made entirely whole he will fare better than society and will not himself
share the economic burden he is asking society to distribute." 27
On the whole, we can safely conclude that the person who is a
victim of another's fault will receive, if the fault principle be abandoned, a minimum recovery which will be but a small portion of the
damage he has suffered and to which he is entitled under our
present system. Let us look at some of the other consequences of this
change. It is suggested, from time to time, that court proceedings
are an expensive way to award compensation to an injured person,
and that this expense will be reduced by a plan similar to workmen's
compensation. Such evidence as is available does not support this
claim. Professor Conard, now of the Michigan Law School, made a
study a few years ago of comparative expense under FELA and the
Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act.28 He found that for each

dollar the injured person received, the employer and his victim each
pay about twice as much in costs in workmen's compensation proceedings as they do in FELA matters, and that the cost to the taxpayer is four and one-quarter cents for each dollar received by the
victim under workmen's compensation, while it is only one-half cent
for each dollar paid out under FELA.29
Nor do I think that it can be persuasively argued that imposition
of liability without fault will lead to a better distribution of loss
throughout society. For practical purposes today, important personal
24. Jaffe, supra note 14, at 235.
25. James, supra note 20, at 549 n.42.
26. HArx a & JAMES, Trw LAw oF TORTS (3 vols.) (1956).
27. 2 HARPER & JAMms, op. cit. supra note 26, § 25.1, at 1302. But see Cooperrider, Comment on The Law of Torts, 56 MicH. L. RF-v. 1291 (1958).
28. Conard, Workmen's Compensation: Is It More Efficient Than Employer's
Liability?, 38 A.B.A.J. 1011 (1952). See also, Richter & Forer, Federal Employers'
Liability Act- A Real Compensatory Law for Railroad Workers, 36 COIINEL L.Q.
203 (1951).
29. Conard, supra note 28.
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injury suits are always against defendants who are in a position to
shift and distribute the loss. Either the defendant is insured, and the
loss is ultimately borne by the policyholders of the insurance company, or it is a business enterprise which is able to pass on the loss
to its customers by increasing the price of its product. The case in
which a verdict is actually paid by an uninsured defendant is now
so rare as to be insignificant Perhaps an administrative scheme for
awarding compensation, accompanied as it would be by compulsory
insurance or self-insurance, would mean a somewhat more thorough
loss distribution than we now have. But the difference would be at
most a rather small difference in degree, rather than a difference in
kind.
Finally, it is said that abandonment of the fault principle will
relieve congestion in the courts. Former Judge David Peck, in New
York, has been the most vocal exponent of the view that trial by
jury in accident cases is a luxury we can no longer afford. Undoubtedly, congestion in the courts would be relieved by taking all
personal injury cases away from the courts and putting them in the
hands of an administrative agency. Indeed the problem of congestion would be completely solved by prohibiting all lawsuits, and
inventing administrative boards to handle all disputes. Strangely,
Judge Peck and his sympathizers never propose this. They are willing to hear the year-long antitrust suits, the contract disputes between industrial giants, and other cases of that kind. I would think
that so long as our courts exist, there is no more important work
they can do than hear the claims of the widowed and the maimed.
I do not wish to minimize the problem of court congestion. Of
course it is shameful that litigants should have to wait four years
to bring their cases to trial in New York City. This is an especially
serious problem since the American Bar Association, ignoring the
views of state courts which have passed on the question, has held
that it is unethical for a lawyer to advance money to a client pending
trial, even though the only alternatives are for the disabled client
either to accept whatever inadequate settlement the defendant may
offer, or to starve. But there are remedies for court congestion which
will solve the problem in the few metropolitan centers where it is a
problem without remitting all injured persons to the tender mercies
of an administrative agency. We can readily provide more courts
and more judges. Modem procedural methods will do a great deal,
as has been dramatically shown by the improvement in the calendar
situation in federal courts in New York City since those courts
started using modem procedural techniques. New York has, in its
state courts, as antiquated a code of procedure as does any important state in this country, and it has shown no real interest in adopt-
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ing modern rules. Until it does, I can not be impressed by the
screams of New York judges for the abolition of jury trial.
I will not pause to mention the ruinous effect on lawyers which
adoption of liability without fault, administered by a state agency,
would have. You can be sure that lawyers' fees would be restricted
in proceedings before such an agency, and that the income of the
profession would be drastically reduced. But we should not continue
to have lawsuits merely to make lawyers rich, any more than we
should abolish lawsuits in this area merely to make less work for
the judges. Instead the decisive consideration must be, what system
will be best for the person who is injured. We have seen, I think,
that for the seventy to eighty-five per cent of injured persons whose
injuries result from the fault of a financially responsible defendant,
the present system is far superior to that which is now being urged.
Under the present system injured persons receive full compensation
for their losses; under the proposed new system they would be
compensated only for a small proportion of their loss.
I have not overlooked the effect which the new system would
have on those who are injured by their own carelessness, or as a
result of an unavoidable accident, or by a defendant who is not
financially responsible. They receive nothing now. If liability without fault should be adopted, they would receive the bare subsistence
payments which would accompany that scheme. For them it undoubtedly would be a change for the better. I am fully sympathetic
to the problem of the uncompensated victim, but I do not think
abolition of the fault principle offers a useful answer to that problem. I do not think we should rob Peter, who was injured through
the carelessness of some other person, of a portion of the full compensation he has coming in order that we may have a little bit to
pay Paul, whose injuries were not the result of fault. Yet this is
exactly what these proposals for liability without fault amount to.
They would give the Peters, who make up seventy to eighty-five
per cent of all injured persons, much less than full compensation, so
that they might give the same bare subsistence sum to the fifteen
to thirty per cent of the injured people who are Pauls.
Perhaps there is something to be said for a universal compensation
system which would make prompt payment of minimal amounts to
all injured persons, while at the same time permitting those whose
injuries are the result of fault to sue for full damages, just as they
now do. This would protect Paul from starvation without impoverishing Peter.80 This is the system in England, and in most foreign
countries. It is the system in Saskatchewan for dealing with automo80. Parker, supra note 21, at 217; Richter & Forer, supra note 27, at 284-85. See
generally James, supra note 20.
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bile accident victims. Indeed I have always thought unanswerable
the argument of Mr. Justice Brandeis in New York Cent. R.R. v.
Winfield,31 that this is permitted by FELA, and that an injured
raliroad worker should be allowed to collect workmen's compensation from his state, regardless of fault, and also sue his employer
under the act, if the employer's fault caused his injury.
I do not expect, however, to see such a plan, providing both for
minimal payments without fault and for substantial damages where
fault exists, adopted in the foreseeable future. Until then I think it is
better to adhere to the fault principle and to leave fact questions to
juries than to adopt any of the proposed plans of liability without
fault. In my judgment a rule which over the years has provided full
and fair compensation for the great bulk of injured persons is better
than one which would mean inadequate awards for all.
31. 244 U.S. 147, 154 (1917) (dissenting opinion).

